Abstract-The problem of cascading failures in cyber-physical networks is garnering much attention for different network models underlining various applications. While a variety of analytic results has been reported for the case of large networks, very few of them are readily applicable to finite-size networks. This paper studies cascading failures in finite-size geometric networks where the number of nodes is on the order of tens or hundreds as in many real-life networks. First, the impact of the tolerance parameter on network resiliency is investigated. We quantify the network reaction to initial disturbances of different sizes by measuring the damage imposed on the network. Lower and upper bounds on the number of failures are derived to characterize such damages. In addition to the finite analysis, an asymptotic analysis of both bounds is carried out, discovering a threshold behavior of the network as the tolerance parameter changes. The critical value of the tolerance parameter in the asymptotic regime is further derived. Findings of this paper, in particular, shed light on how to choose the tolerance parameter appropriately such that a cascade of failures could be avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION A cascading failure in a complex network is a phenomenon in which the failure of a small set of nodes triggers the failure of successive nodes, leading to the failure of a large fraction of nodes eventually. There have been many types of cascading failure events occurring in natural and manmade systems, from power grid and computer networks to political, economic, and ecological systems. Cascading failure is common in power grids, where a single failure of a fully loaded or slightly overloaded node (component) could set off more overloads, thereby taking down the entire A. Eslami is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA (email: eslami@tamu.edu). He is also a visiting scholar at Information Initiative at Duke University, Durham, NC, USA.
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The work of S. Cui was supported in part by Department of Defense with grant HDTRA1-13-1-0029, by National Science Foundation with grants CNS-1343155, ECCS-1305979, and CNS-1265227, and by grant NSFC-61328102. Cascading failures can also occur in computer networks (such as the Internet), when a crucial router or node becomes overloaded. Network traffic then needs to be rerouted through an alternative path. This alternative path, as a result, may become overloaded, causing path break-down, and so on.
The problem of cascading failures in complex networks has been studied extensively [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , especially for large networks. For analytical purposes, different types of random graphs have been used as models of complex networks, including Bernoulli random graphs, random geometric graphs, and scale-free graphs [9] [10] [11] [12] . Also, depending on the underlying applications, different models of failure propagation have been considered. The two popular categories of propagation rules are the degree-based and load-based propagation. In a degree-based propagation, the state of each node is determined by the states of all or part of its neighbors in the network [1] , [4] , [9] , [12] , [13] . For example, in [9] , each node is assigned a random threshold ϕ, and it fails if at least a fraction ϕ of its neighbors fail. On the other hand, in a load-based propagation, the state of a node is defined over the amount of load carried by the node [2] , [10] . For instance in [10] , each node can carry a load up to its capacity, above which it becomes overloaded. An overloaded node fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors.
While the vast majority of the existing analytical work is focused on large-scale networks, their findings can hardly be applied to the small or moderate size networks that we face in the real world. In this paper, we are concerned with providing rigorous analytical results for finite-size networks. Furthermore, we are interested in studying cascading failures in networks with geometric characteristics such as electrical power grids and wireless communication networks, which are well-modeled as random geometric graphs. Indeed, random geometric graphs have been widely used in studying wireless networks (see [14] and references therein). Also, it is shown that geometry plays an important role in quantifying the topology of the smart grid communication and control networks [15] .
We adopt load-based failure propagation in this paper as it makes sense in a group of important applications such as the power grid and wireless networks. We assume that each node has a certain capacity, part of which is used to carry a load in normal conditions. If, for any reason, a node receives more load than its capacity, it fails and redistributes its load to its neighbors. A node here could be a component in the power grid, such as a transmission line or a regional transformer, which usually operates in normal conditions but is able to handle higher loads up to a certain capacity. A node could also be a device in a wireless distributed storage network, or a routing hub in the Internet. In all these cases, a node could be assumed to operate under a certain load in normal situations, while it is able to handle a higher load up to a limit, if necessary.
The relative gap between the capacity and the normal load of a node is specified by the tolerance parameter [2] , [10] . Tolerance parameter is a design parameter that plays an important role in network resiliency against a cascade. When resiliency is the priority, a larger tolerance parameter is desired as it enables the network to handle more severe operation disturbances. However, a larger tolerance parameter leads to a larger unused capacity that imposes higher costs. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain a clear understanding of the impact of tolerance parameter on network reaction to disruptions of different scales. In this paper, we characterize such reaction through analytical means in both finite and asymptotic regimes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain the network model and notations, while formally stating the problem. Sections III, IV, and V provide the main results and the bulk of the analysis. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this paper, we consider a network modeled by a random geometric graph G(λ, R), whose nodes are deployed in a region S according to a Poisson point process with density λ. There is an edge between each pair of nodes if they are less than a distance R apart. We assume that S is a circular region with diameter D and centered at the origin 0. However, the results presented in this paper can be extended to other deployment regions with minimal changes. Initially, all the nodes carry the same amount of load l, and have the same capacity c = αl, where α ≥ 1 is the tolerance parameter. While the load of each node may change over time, the capacity remains constant. A node is called "healthy" if it carries a load less than its capacity.
A dish attack on S is modeled by a circle A of radius R a < D/2 centered at the origin. This is shown in Fig. 1 . After the attack, all the nodes located at a distance r < R a from the center of attack will fail, and their load will be redistributed to their neighbors, which in turn may lead to a propagation of failures throughout the network. We assume that a dish attack only affects the nodes inside the dish, not the ones located on its border at r = R a . We focus on the set of conditions under which a cascading failure is realized, and study the corresponding damage caused by such a cascade. We assume the following model for the propagation of failures. At any stage of cascade, when a node fails, its load will be redistributed equally among its healthy neighbors. A node that carries a total load greater than its capacity will fail.
The number of failures at each stage is clearly a random variable (r.v.). In this paper, we focus on characterizing the impact of an attack on the network. To measure such an impact, we use the number of failures, outside the attacked region, caused by a limited dish attack. Let F denote this number. We define failure ratio as
where |S \ A| is the total number of nodes outside the attack region. We denote byf the average value of the random variable f taken over all realizations of G(λ, R), and use it to measure the impact of an attack. We are particularly interested in the variation off as the tolerance parameter α changes. Fig. 2 showsf versus α for a typical attack on a network where R a = R = 0.1 and D = 1, for different values of λ. The contributions of this paper could be summarized as follows:
• While finding a closed-form expression forf in the finite regime could be very difficult, we analytically derive lower and upper bounds forf with manageable computational complexity. These bounds provide us with valuable insights into network resiliency when designing real-world networks. We also present an asymptotic analysis of our bounds.
• As it can be seen in Fig. 2 , the failure ratio changes rather quickly over a short interval of α. We will show that this interval tends to zero as λ goes to infinity. Particularly, in such an asymptotic case, there exists a threshold value of α, denoted as α U , such thatf = 1 if α < α U , andf = 0 if α ≥ α U . We will find α U in terms of other network parameters. Connected vs. Disconnected Graphs: By definition, in a connected network, there exists a path between any two arbitrary nodes. For G(λ, R), connectivity is only guaranteed when λ → ∞. In practice, however, the probability of connectivity could be arbitrarily close to 1 if λ is chosen large enough. Note that G(λ, R) defines a probability space with a sample space consisting of all possible realizations of G(λ, R). For finite values of λ, let G c (λ, R) be the connected subspace of the larger probability space G(λ, R), formed by all the connected realizations of G(λ, R). In our analysis, whenever connectivity is needed, we will consider G c (λ, R). In simulations, however, it is extremely time-consuming to check the connectivity of each realization. Therefore, in order to have a connectivity probability close to 1, we assume λ is chosen such that λπR 2 ≥ 6. In this way, the probability of a node being isolated, which accounts for the dominant term in the probability of disconnectivity, is upper-bounded as exp(−λπR 2 ) ≤ exp(−6) = 2.5 × 10 −3 [16] .
A. Preliminaries
Here, we provide some notations and preliminaries required to understand our results. We denote the number of nodes in the attack region A by a. Note that a is a Poisson r.v. with parameterā
It makes sense to assume that a dish attack is large enough to affect at least one node. Therefore, we assumeā = λπR 2 a ≥ 3 which leads to Pr(a ≥ 1) > 0.95.
Consider the rings (annuli) of width R around the attacked region, as depicted in Fig. 1 . For i ≥ 1, we denote an annulus with inner radius R i−1 = R a + (i − 1)R and outer radius R i = R a + iR by A i , and the set of nodes in A i by A i . We denote the cardinality of A i by a i . Note that a i , which is the number of nodes in the ring A i , is simply a Poisson random variable with parameter
The following lemmas will help us in our sequential analysis. For the sake of brevity, we omit the proofs in this paper. We refer the reader to [17] , a longer version of this paper which includes all the proofs.
a ≥ 3 and λπR 2 ≥ 6, as it is assumed in this paper. We will then havē
Sinceā i is greater than 10, Lemma 1 implies that the Poisson r.v. a i could be well approximated by a Gaussian r.v. for i ≥ 1 [18] . We will make it clear when we use this assumption in our analysis. Consider two circles, one with radius r 1 centered at a distance a from the origin, and one with radius r 2 centered at a distance b. We denote by I(a, r 1 , b, r 2 ) the intersection region of these two circles, while we use I(a, r 1 , b, r 2 ) to show the area of this region, which could be obtained as [18] I(a, r 1 , b, r 2 )) =r
Lemma 2. Let u be a node located randomly and uniformly on I(0, R a , r v , R) where r v ≥ R a , as shown in Fig. 3 . Also let r be the random variable representing u's distance from the center of attack (i.e., the origin). Then the probability distribution function (PDF) of r is given as
III. AN UPPER BOUND ON FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we turn our attention to a necessary condition for having a cascade. A cascade of failures is possible only if at least one node outside the attack region fails due to the load redistribution. Otherwise, if the load of the attacked nodes in A is completely absorbed by the rest of the network, a propagation of failures does not occur. By finding the probability of this event, we could derive an upper bound on the average failure ratio.
We start our analysis for the finite-size networks by investigating the load received by nodes outside the attack region, immediately after the attack. This is the load received by immediate neighbors of the attacked nodes after the first stage of load redistribution. Note that the load received by each node is a random variable. Also recall that the neighbors of the attacked region are all located in A 1 . We will first find the mean and standard deviation of the load received by these nodes. Having the statistics of this random variable, we then show that its distribution could be well approximated by a Gaussian random variable. Using such an approximation, we then find the probability of an overload for the nodes in A 1 , which later helps us find an upper bound on the average failure ratio. Recall that "average" here stands for an average taken over all graph realizations. The following lemma gives the statistics of the load received by a node in A 1 from each of its neighbors in A, upon the first redistribution of loads after the attack. All the proofs are omitted in this paper, and could be found in [17] . Fig. 4 . Let
Lemma 3. Consider a node v located at a distance r v ∈ [R a , R a + R) from the center of attack. Also consider a node u, a neighbor of v inside the attacked region, located randomly and uniformly on I(r v , R, 0, R a ). This is shown in
The average load l u redistributed to v from u is obtained as where
In the above, J(r) πR
The following theorem applies the results of Lemma 3 to find the mean value and variance of the total load redistributed to a node in A 1 , right after the attack.
Theorem 1. Consider a node v located at a distance r v ∈ [R a , R a + R) from the center of attack. Let L v be the load redistributed to v by its neighbors inside the attacked region. We then have
where h (1) (r) is defined in (10) , and σ 2 lu is given by (12) . If R − r v ≥ R a , (13) and (14) are reduced to
where g(·) is given by (7) , and J *
Now that we have the mean and variance of L v , an approximation of L v 's PDF could be obtained using the central limit theorem as follows. Note that
where N is the number of nodes inside I(r v , R, 0, R a ), a Poisson r.v. with mean λI(r v , R, 0, R a ). Given that N = n, the nodes u = 1, ..., n would be distributed randomly and independently on I(r v , R, 0, R a ), making l u 's i.i.d. random variables. Therefore, for large values of n, the central limit theorem asserts that the probability distribution of L v is wellapproximated by a Gaussian random variable. In practice, however, n ≥ 5 is large enough to ensure a PDF very close to the normal random variable [18] . On the other hand, when λI(r v , R, 0, R a ) is small due to either λ or I(r v , R, 0, R a ) being small, L v would be very small as well. Since the Gaussian approximation for L v also turns small values in such cases, the error in the approximation becomes negligible. We refer the reader to [17] for a thorough discussion of the Gaussian approximation of L v . Using such an approximation, we could find the probability of survival for the nodes in A 1 , after the first stage of load redistribution. 
where Using Theorem 2, an upper bound on the average failure ratio could be obtained for finite values of λ.
Theorem 3. The average failure ratio due to a dish attack of radius R a is upper-bounded as
where
is the density of nodes in A 1 , and p 1 is given by Theorem 2.
Outline of Proof:
where p 0 Pr{no failures in A 1 } is the probability that the load received by every node in A 1 is less than α − 1, obtainable using Theorem 2 as e −λ1 (1−p1) . Fig. 5 depicts the upper bound from Theorem 3 for different values of network parameters, where we also include the simulation results for the exact value off . As it can be seen, the proposed upper bound is especially helpful when it comes to picking a value of α to avoid a cascade. For example, for the network G(λ = 400, R = 0.1), the upper bound suggests that α = 3 is a good choice to contain dish attacks of radius R a = 0.1 or smaller. 
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF UPPER BOUND AND THRESHOLD BEHAVIOR OF FAILURE RATIO
While Theorem 3 provides an upper bound on the failure ratio in finite-size networks, an asymptotic analysis of the upper bound could provide intuition regarding the behavior of a large network under attacks. As we will see, such an analysis reveals the threshold behavior of the failure ratio in terms of the tolerance parameter. For the case when λ → ∞, it will be shown that as the tolerance parameter increases above 1, the failure ratio drops from 1 to 0 at a critical value of the tolerance parameter. We will find this critical value, which could be very helpful when studying robustness of large networks to cascades. We start our analysis by finding what happens to the load L v in Theorem 1 when λ → ∞. In this section, in order to explicitly show the dependence of L v on r v , we use the notation L(r v ) instead of L v for the load received by node v located at r v . This slight modification will prove helpful in understanding the results below.
Theorem 4. Consider a dish attack of radius R a applied to a network G(λ, R). Let L(r v ) be the load received by a node v located at a distance r v ∈ [R a , R a + R) from the center of attack, right after the attack. When λ → ∞, L(r v ) is no longer a random variable, and given as
where J(r) = πR 2 − I(r, R, 0, R a ).
As we discussed in Section III, α − 1 < L(R a ) is a necessary condition to have any propagation of failures outside the attack region. In the asymptotic case, however, it could be shown that α − 1 < L(R a ) is also a sufficient condition for a cascade. In fact, when α − 1 < L(R a ), all the nodes would fail as λ → ∞. This is shown by the following theorem where the critical value of α is obtained for the asymptotic case. 
Theorem 5. Consider a dish attack of radius
Fig . 6 demonstrates the evolution of the average failure ratiof as λ grows larger. It also shows the value of α U given by Theorem 5 for the asymptotic case. As it can be seen, a threshold behavior around α U becomes clear as λ increases.
V. A LOWER BOUND ON FAILURE RATIO
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the failure ratio by analyzing a sufficient condition for the propagation of failures throughout the network. This condition is based on the fact that if a cascade cannot be stopped in the presence of a) full cooperation between nodes, and b) the most favorable connectivity condition, then for sure it cannot be stopped without them.
Recall the rings A i , i ≥ 1, in Fig. 1 . A cascade of failures, at each stage of its progress, goes through one of these rings. Let us look at how the failure propagates after the attack. After an attack on A, all the nodes that may potentially fail in the next step are the neighbors of A located in A 1 . If some of the nodes in A 1 fail, the next step of propagation includes some nodes in A 1 
Let us elaborate on what is implied by Lemma 4. Here, a 0 is given as the initial number of failed nodes due to the attack. In its best, a 1 (α−1) is the excess capacity available to absorb the load of these a 0 failed nodes. Now consider the most favorable load redistribution scenario where all the nodes in A can collaborate and all the nodes in A 1 are connected to A. Then, nodes in A can redistribute their loads equally among the set A 1 in order to use all the excess capacity and avoid a cascade. If a 0 > a 1 (α − 1), A 1 cannot absorb the load of A, and the aggregate load of a 0 + a 1 needs to be absorbed by the rest of the nodes. However, Lemma 4 asserts that such an absorbtion becomes even less likely, and the failure propagates through A 2 , A 3 , and outer rings until it takes out the whole network. Therefore, the probability of a total failure is lower-bounded by Pr{a 0 > a 1 (α − 1)}. This property leads to the following lower bound on the failure ratio. 
we havē Note that Φ(·) ≤ 1, andā k /k! decays very fast as k grows aboveā. Hence, in practice, the summation in (25) needs to be calculated only for ⌊2ā⌋ or ⌊3ā⌋ terms. Fig. 7 depicts the lower bound from Theorem 6 along with the simulation result for the average failure ratio. The upper bound from Theorem 3 is also shown for comparison. As we see, the two bounds together successfully predict the interval, within which the failure ratio decreases from 1 to 0.
A. Asymptotic Analysis of the Lower Bound
Here, we look at the lower bound obtained in the previous section from an asymptotic point of view. As λ grows very large, similar to what was observed for the upper bound in Section IV, the lower bound of Theorem 6 takes the shape of 
all the nodes would fail. VI. CONCLUSION This paper investigates the problem of cascading failures in finite-size networks modeled by random geometric graphs. Rigorous analytical results have been provided for studying network resiliency under a dish attack of a given size. In particular, the average failure ratio due to the attack was studied in terms of the tolerance parameter, which is a critical design consideration in real-life networks. By deriving the lower and upper bounds on the average failure ratio, we were able to track the network reaction to different attacks. The asymptotic analysis of both bounds has also been presented. Particularly, the asymptotic analysis of the upper bound revealed the threshold behavior of the network reaction to the changes in the tolerance parameter. Our findings can be exploited to choose appropriate values of the tolerance parameter to avoid a cascade in a given network.
